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THE IMPACTS OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR DISASTER ON
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION:
AN EXAMINATION OF TEPCO’S DAILY LOAD CURVE

This paper analyzes the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster on Tokyo
Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) electricity load using alternative event study
methodology. The data set includes TEPCO’s published hourly loads from January 1,
2008 to December 31, 2011. Four time series regressions are used to analyze the
disaster’s effect on TEPCO’s load curve at an hourly and aggregate level. By examining
the hourly impacts of the disaster, this paper provides commentary on the effects of the
disaster on the daily load curve. The models control for temperature, population, time of
day, week, month, and year, holidays, and trends. The results indicate a significant,
negative relationship between the disaster and TEPCO’s electricity load. In addition to
examining the effects of the disaster on the daily load curve, four event windows are
analyzed, ranging from a week after the March 11, 2011 disaster to the end of the data set
(December 31, 2011). These event windows are used to capture the short, medium, and
long-term effects of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster on electricity load. These event
window results combined with an analysis of the annual and disaster trend variables
allow for commentary on the timeline for which TEPCO’s loads will reach pre-disaster
levels. Additionally, the results provide insight into both the economic and political
implications of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster both in Japan and worldwide.
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5
Introduction:
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster occurred on March 11, 2011 following
the Tohoku earthquake and ensuing tsunami. The Tohoku earthquake was the most
powerful earthquake ever recorded in Japan and its effects combined with the consequent
nuclear disaster have significantly impacted the Japanese people as they have faced
relocation, potential health risks due to radiation exposure, and the loss of friends and
family. The economic consequences have been considerable, resulting in a 2.1 percent
decrease in national GDP in the second quarter of 2011 compared to the same period in
the previous year. Additionally, industrial production and exports dropped by seven and
eight percent, respectively, with the most severe losses in the automobile, electronic
equipment, and metal industries.1 On a global level, the disaster has disrupted both the
energy market and the supply chain for many manufactured goods. In terms of the energy
market, the disaster has affected both the countries that are currently reliant on nuclear
energy and the emerging markets that are in the process of constructing nuclear power
plants. The Fukushima Daiichi disaster has raised questions and insecurities regarding the
future use of nuclear energy both in Japan and worldwide.
This paper focuses solely on the nuclear disaster’s effect on the service area of the
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), owner of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
plant, and the direct impact of the accident on the region. The goal of this paper is to
identify the magnitude of the disaster’s effect on TEPCO’s load curve at an hourly and
aggregate level. Specifically, I investigate how the daily load shape has changed and
1

Masahisa Fujita and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, “Japan and Economic Integration in East Asia: Post-Disaster
Scenario,” Annals of Regional Science 48 (2012): 493, ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April
2012.
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connect these changes to Japanese consumer response to the nuclear disaster by
identifying which hours experienced the most significant changes post-Fukushima
Daiichi. In addition, I determine whether these changes are short-term and slowly
reverting back to demand preferences similar to those before the nuclear crisis, or if these
changes are going to have long term impacts due to more permanent shifts to alternative
energy sources such as combustion gas turbines and renewable energy.
I predict that aggregate and hourly examinations of post-Fukushima Daiichi loads
will demonstrate that the disaster significantly impacted the daily load curve in a negative
way, and that loads are slowly shifting back to levels seen before the nuclear disaster. I
predict that business hours (hours 7 to 17) will see the most significant load changes after
the disaster because they are the most active time of the day for Japanese consumers and,
therefore, saving efforts will be the most evident during these hours. In order to test these
hypotheses I run a statistical analysis of TEPCO’s hourly loads from January 1, 2008 to
December 31, 2011, using interactive dummy variables and trend variables to capture the
significance of the disaster on hourly electricity consumption and overall load
movements.
An alternative event study approach is used to set up four regressions followed by
hourly load comparisons. The first two include a single disaster dummy variable with
TEPCO’s hourly loads as the dependent variable in the first and the log of TEPCO’s
hourly loads as the dependent variable in the second. The other two have the same
dependent variables as the first two, but include interactive hourly disaster variables that
capture the hourly impact of the disaster on the loads. After the data is regressed, t-tests
are performed, comparing the hourly variables to the interactive hourly disaster variables
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and testing for significance. The first two regressions yielded significant disaster
variables at the one percent level, positive post-disaster trends, and negative annual
trends. The third and fourth regressions yielded significant hourly and interactive hourly
disaster variables at the one percent level, with the most extreme significance occurring
during the on-peak hours, especially during periods of transition (hours seven to nine and
seventeen to nineteen). Additionally, these regressions yielded similar trends to those in
models one and two.
This event study provides an in-depth look into both consumer and government
reactions to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and provides insight into the future of
the electricity industry in Tokyo. The significance of these disaster and trend variables
sheds light onto the longevity of consumer saving measures as well as the recovery pace
of electricity loads to pre-disaster levels. This paper provides commentary regarding the
success of policy measures, specifically the fifteen percent government mandated
decrease in demand, that have been in place since the disaster. Additionally, the paper
comments on the further success of consumers in decreasing demand beyond what is
required of them. If these changes in electricity consumption become more permanent, as
this paper suggests, future policies and utility structures will be forced to adapt, possibly
resulting in market liberalization, higher prices, or grid transformation. Regardless of the
result, the changes in electricity demand analyzed here will force consumers, regulators,
and the Japanese government to reconsider not only the future of nuclear energy but also
the structure of the energy industry as a whole. This paper also comments on the
disaster’s effect on Japan as a whole due to electricity’s influence in all sectors of the
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economy. Consequently, the results produced here will indicate movements in both
consumer sentiment and overall economic recovery.
Institutional Background:
The daily load curve depicts the demand for electricity throughout a 24-hour day
and provides a detailed look into consumer preferences. The demand for electricity
fluctuates more sharply in Japan than it does in other countries such as the United States,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. A typical load curve in Tokyo spikes at six or seven
a.m. when commercial buildings open and lights and air conditioning units are turned on.
The curve then continues at this load level throughout business hours with a slight
decrease during lunch hours. At hour sixteen or seventeen (16:00 or 17:00) the load
begins to decrease as consumers leave the office and travel home. As a result, a typical
load curve’s on-peak hours (higher loads) are between hours seven and seventeen as
illustrated in Figure 1.2 Significant variables that impact the load curve include
temperature, humidity, and time of day, week, and year.3 Analysis of the load curve is
critical in determining changes in demand preferences in the Tokyo area post-Fukushima
because the curve identifies the hours consumers have targeted to conserve energy and
the magnitude of these conservation efforts.

2

TEPCO, “Electricity Market in Japan,” PowerPoint Presentation to Public, July 2004.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/presen/pdf-1/0406-e.pdf, accessed February 2012.
3
Philip Price, Methods for Analyzing Electricity Load Shape and its Variability (Lawrence Berkeley Lab,
August 2010), p. 5.
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In Japan, demand for electricity can be broken down into three main sectors.
Industrial buildings use 61.5 percent of electricity, residential buildings use 33.2 percent,
and commercial buildings use 3.9 percent, while only 1.4 percent is used for other
purposes such as public, outdoor lighting.4 In terms of volatility, the increase in industrial
demand each day from trough to peak is only 25 percent, whereas households use three
times as much electricity at their peak compared to their trough and commercial users use

4

Mark Fulton, Michael Carboy, Jane Cao, and Lucy Cotter, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice,”
Deutsche Bank Group, August 2011,
http://nukefreetexas.org/downloads/Japan_The_Peoples_Greener_Choice.pdf, accessed
October 2011.
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around ten times as much electricity at their peak compared to their trough.5 These vast
differences indicate the wide variety of consumer preferences that exist within Japan and
highlight the volatility that exists within the daily load curve. The large spike within daily
commercial electricity demand at peak hours suggests that saving measures within this
sector could be the most beneficial because peak hours typically have the tightest margin
between electricity supply and demand. The Institute of Energy Economics in Japan
released a quarterly report stating that office and commercial buildings account for 40
percent of total electricity consumption during peak demand hours. The report further
states that commercial consumers have the ability to cut electricity consumption by 2.8 to
4.7 GW (gigawatt) by turning off lights and increasing indoor temperatures more
frequently.6 As a result, the Japanese government directed their post-Fukushima
electricity cuts towards this sector.7
As a whole, Japan has a limited domestic energy production and imports 83
percent of its total energy supply. The country is heavily reliant on oil and natural gas
imports. In an effort to decrease this reliance, Japan built a large number of nuclear
reactors and swayed public opinion on nuclear power through tax incentives. Before the
Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan’s target was to have half of its total energy supply
come from nuclear energy by 2030; however the nuclear disaster has put those plans on
pause as nuclear power plants are reevaluated and public concern increases. Further

5

6

“Japan’s energy crisis: Powerful savings.” The Economist, April 27, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/04/japans_energy_crisis, accessed October 2011.

“Summer Electricity Saving Measures and Their Effects for Office and Commercial Buildings,” The
Institute of Energy Economics, May 2011, accessed October 2011.
7
Shigeru Sato, “Tokyo Power Demand Reaches Highest since Quake on Heat Wave,” Bloomberg, June 29,
2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-29/tokyo-power-demand-reaches-highest-sincequake-on-heat-wave-2-.html, accessed October 2011.
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restricting Japan’s energy supply is its grid system, which varies within the country.
Eastern Japan’s grid was set up using a German 50 Hz AC system, whereas Western
Japan was designed using a General Electric 60 Hz AC system. Converting between these
two frequencies requires a complex substation and Japan has only three substations
capable of this conversion. The aggregate capacity of these substations is 1.2 GW, which
limits the amount of electricity that can be transferred between the two regions.8 This
limitation is especially problematic during a supply crisis such as the one that occurred
after Fukushima, because the two regions cannot share resources easily.
Another unique facet of Japan’s energy structure is that Japan has ten regional
monopolies, all part of the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC).
While this system may seem similar to the utility structure in the United States, utilities in
Japan charge residents a flat rate throughout the day, removing incentives to save
electricity during peak hours9. Due to the lack of competition, electricity prices for
Japanese consumers are nearly twice as much the electricity prices paid by Americans
and three times as much as those paid by South Koreans.10 Market liberalization has been
marginal and unsupported by big businesses because they sell parts and services to the
monopolies in exchange for discounted electricity.11 Market liberalization has been
implemented in stages beginning in March 2000 when consumers using more than 2MW
of electricity were allowed to purchase from power producers and suppliers (PPSs)
unassociated with the regional utilities. The next stage began in April 2005 and allowed
8

9

Fulton, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice.”

“History of Japan’s Electric Power Industry.” Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan.
http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/history/index.html, accessed February 2012.
10
“Energy in Japan: Bright ideas needed,” The Economist, September 17, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/21529037, accessed October 2011.
11
Ibid.
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consumers whose demand exceeds 50kW to purchase from PPSs. The rest of the
liberalization plan, which would have affected the majority of the Japanese population,
was abandoned in March 2008.12 As a result, the electricity market is still very
constrained; however, Japan’s consumer response to the nuclear disaster has been
significant given the current structure and government involvement.
The Fukushima Daiichi disaster eliminated 1.8 percent of Japan’s energy
capacity.13 Roughly 9.7 GW of nuclear power and 9 GW of thermal power went offline
instantaneously and TEPCO planned rolling blackouts to ration the limited power supply
although no blackouts were actually enabled. On March 21, TEPCO’s supply capacity
was 30 percent below normal peak demand even as TEPCO ramped up functioning plants
and started up oil-fired backup plants.14 The three major utilities affected (TEPCO,
Tohoku Electric, and Hokkaido Electric) all would have faced significant negative
margins if confronted with normal demand circumstances. In this paper, margins refer to
the difference between current quantity supplied and current quantity demanded. In
particular, they would have encountered negative six to seven percent shortfalls between
post-disaster generating capacity and normal levels of demand.
However, reduced demand (by as much as 25 percent in the Tokyo area) due to
government regulation and consumer savings created an eight percent reserve margin.15

12

“Fair Competition and Transparency.” Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan.
http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/fair_competition/index.html, accessed
February 2012.
13
“Disaster in Japan: Plutonium and Mickey Mouse.” The Economist, March 31, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/18488463, accessed October 2011.
14
Tomoko Hosoe, “Japan’s Power Supply Crisis: An Assesment,” East-West Wire, March 21, 2011,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/japans-power-supply-crisis-anassessment, accessed November 2012.
15
Fulton, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice.”
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Japan’s government regulation included electricity saving targets of 15 percent for most
sectors. Specifically, for industries consuming more than 500kW, the government
implemented Article 27 of the Electricity Business Act, which required companies within
the industry to cut electricity consumption by 15 percent between the hours of 9:00 and
20:00 for the period from July 1, 2011 to September 22, 2011. Failure to yield to these
restrictions resulted in penalties of up to 1 million yen for each hour in which the target
was not met.16 The additional power conservation beyond the Japanese government’s
requirements highlights consumers’ ability to effectively react to a disaster and the
possibility for considerable change in the daily load curve for electricity within TEPCO’s
service area.
In response to the tight supply of energy, Japan’s Ministry of Trade, Economy,
and Industry (METI), created saving measures and goals for the summer of 2011. On the
demand side, METI suggested extending and staggering summer holidays, shortening
operating hours, utilizing facilities outside of Tokyo, installing smart meters to keep
consumers informed about the amount of electricity they are using, and increasing
national awareness.17 On the supply side, gas turbines were to be installed, thermal plants
restored, private power purchased, and supply vehicles increased and diversified. In
adhering to these suggestions, many industries have responded with significant changes
to their schedules. Some industrial firms, such as Toyota, have delayed production and
others have shifted their work hours in order to avoid high-demand periods. For example,
throughout the summer the Japanese car industry took Thursdays and Fridays off and

16

Sara Pasquier, “Saving Electricity in a Hurry: Update 2011.” International Energy Agency, June 2011.
www.iea.org/papers/2011/saving_electricity.pdf, accessed February 2012.
17
Ibid.
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worked on the weekend when electricity demand is significantly lower.18 These changes
have come at significant economic costs to Japan. Specifically, Japanese automobile
production in March 2011 was 57.3 percent less than that in the same month last year.19
In an effort to support economic recovery, the government implemented a number of
financial packages for small and medium enterprises, which have totaled 10 trillion yen
to date.20
In a report on the crisis, Deutsche Bank Group divides Japan’s recovery from this
disaster into three phases. Phase I centers on immediate actions focused mostly on
behavioral changes. Phase II addresses renewable expansion and grid transformation,
while Phase III addresses long-term energy planning. The immediate removal of a large
portion of nuclear energy from TEPCO’s electricity supply required that additional power
be attained through alternative sources. This acquisition was done largely through the
procurement of natural gas and coal. TEPCO’s short-term solution entailed procuring
low-sulfur fuel oil from local refineries that had an excess supply due to the short-term
decline in industrial activities, while also buying crude oil from the market.21 Japan’s
liquefied natural gas (LNG) and coal imports increased the country’s import bill for the
two fuels in the five-month period from April 1 to August 31 by 31 percent to 2.45
trillion yen from the same period a year earlier.22 From a macro perspective, Japan

18

“Energy in Japan: Bright ideas needed,” The Economist.
Masahisa Fujita and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, “Japan and Economic Integration in East Asia: Post-Disaster
Scenario,” Annals of Regional Science 48 (2012): 494, accessed April 2012.
20
Joni Jupesta and Aki Suwa, “Sustainable Energy Policy in Japan, Post Fukushima,” International
Association for Energy Economics, Fourth Quarter 2011, accessed October 2011.
21
Hosoe, “Japan’s Power Supply Crisis: An Assesment,” East-West Wire.
22
Shigeru Sato and Emi Urabe, “Power Companies Borrow Record in Loans as Cost of FuelJumps: Japan
Credit,” Bloomberg, October 6, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/powercompanies-borrow-record-in-loans-as-cost-of-fuel-jumps-japan-credit.html, accessed October
2011.
19
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consumes approximately 65 percent of the LNG shipments to Asia and approximately 35
percent of worldwide shipments. This increased demand has caused a 50 percent increase
in spot prices (US$15/mmBTU level), which has not come at a light cost for TEPCO.23
The immediate effect of the disaster on TEPCO was significant and disastrous.
TEPCO shares have lost four-fifths of their value and its debt has been downgraded to
junk. As a result, TEPCO’s president stepped down and the company intends to sell all of
its assets unrelated to supplying energy. Internal cuts have been considerable, as workers
have seen wage cuts of as much as 25 percent. TEPCO compensation payments to those
affected by the disaster could exceed its assets of 186 billion yen.24 A multitude of
problems would be created for both TEPCO and the government if the company becomes
insolvent. To prevent insolvency in the short run, TEPCO would need a five percent
increase in prices contingent upon its nuclear plants restarting in a year and as much as a
10 percent price increase if the plants cannot be restarted within a year. These price
changes would barely keep the utility in the black.25 As a result, the government is in the
process of discussing the future of TEPCO and has considered a few options including
bankruptcy, nationalization, splitting up transmission and generation into individual

23
24

Fulton, “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener Choice.”

“Power in Japan: The troubles of TEPCO,” The Economist, June 30, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/18899008, accessed October 2011.
25
Rick Wallace, “Tokyo must decide who will pay to keep Fukushima plant owner TEPCO afloat,” The
Australian, October 7, 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/tokyo-mustdecide-who-will-pay-to-keep-fukushima-plant-owner-tepco-afloat/story-e6frg9if-1226160647274,
accessed October 2011.
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entities, and establishing an independent government entity that would purchase TEPCO
assets in return for compensation funding.26
On November 4th, 2011 the METI approved the release of $64 billion dollars of
government funding to TEPCO for compensation payments and to avoid insolvency;
however, the nationalization of TEPCO is still a largely controversial topic throughout
Japan.27 The METI minister Yukio Edano has indicated that no additional money will be
released to TEPCO “without the Japanese government gaining a right to take over and
reform the utility.”28 While some Japanese officials think nationalization is appropriate to
ensure successful financial and managerial restructuring, others such as Hiromasa
Yonekura, the chairman of the Japan Business Federation, are against nationalization and
think electricity rate increases would be a more effective approach to rebuilding the
company.29 On April 1, 2012, the company raised electricity prices for corporate clients
by an average of 17 percent, citing higher fuel costs as justification for the increase. This
increase is the first time the company has raised electricity prices in more than 30 years
and could potentially push consumers to further increase their conservation efforts.30 The
success of this decision will have an impact on whether the company is forced to
nationalize, as such the future of not only TEPCO, but also Japan’s utility system as a
whole remains uncertain.
26

“Japan’s nuclear plants: Half-life,” The Economist, May 20, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/05/japans_nuclear_plants, accessed October
2011.
27
“Japan’s nuclear conundrum: The $64 billion question,” The Economist, November 5, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/21536600, accessed February 2012.
28
Mitsuru Obe, “Japan Business Lobby Head: Against Nationalization of Tepco, Support Electricity Rate
Hikes,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120227701005.html?mod=WSJ_qtoverview_wsjlatest, accessed February 2012.
29
Ibid., p.1.
30
“TEPCO raises electricity prices for corporate clients,” BBC News, January 17, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16589072, accessed February 2012.
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Blame for the aftereffects of the nuclear disaster has fluctuated between TEPCO
and the Japanese government as the Japanese people criticize past and present nuclear
energy policies. The Economist calls the relationship between TEPCO, the government,
and the METI “an unholy triangle” because the METI simultaneously oversees the
regulator that is responsible for addressing utility safety issues and promotes the nuclear
industry.31 The Fukushima Daiichi plant has malfunctioned multiple times and TEPCO
has concealed problems since its creation, yet there have been no significant
consequences for their actions. In fact, Japan’s Supreme Court has never ruled against
any power company.32 Furthermore, the media reporting on the issue has been regulated
due to outlets’ inability to scrutinize energy companies because of Japan’s “press club”
system, which allows the media to ask questions only at formal press conferences. One
such conference occurred at the first public hearing of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission held on January 16, 2012, months after the
nuclear disaster. The “press club” is invitation only, so no outlet has openly criticized
TEPCO, the government, or METI for fear of being dropped from the hearings.33 These
media limitations have controlled public knowledge of the disaster, heightening the
public’s uncertainty concerning the future of nuclear energy in Japan.
The International Association for Energy Economics has reported statistics on
public opinion concerning nuclear energy issues. They find that 74 percent of Japanese
voters support abolishing nuclear power after a phase-out period and 65 percent want
31

“Disaster in Japan: Plutonium and Mickey Mouse.” The Economist, March 31, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/18488463, accessed October 2011.
32
Masao Kikuchi and Akira Nakamura, “What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet Learned: Triple
Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan,” Public Administration Review 71, (2011):
895, ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed January 2012.
33 “Japan’s nuclear crisis: The Meltdown and the Media,” The Economist, January 16, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21542992, accessed February 2012.
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implementation of renewable power sources even at the expense of higher electricity
fees.34 As a result of these anti-nuclear sentiments, it is entirely possible that local
governments could force a shutdown of all of Japan’s nuclear capacity by choosing to
keep plants in their respective areas shut down. The future of the nuclear industry is
strongly linked to local government approval because of the structure of regional utilities.
For example, Kansai Electric regional utility’s (KEPCO) biggest shareholder is
the city of Osaka. The mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, effectively the company’s
largest shareholder, has threatened to “end KEPCO’s monopoly on power generation and
distribution” if the utility does not keep ten of its eleven nuclear reactors shut down.35
Due to similar sentiments throughout Japan, 48 out of 54 nuclear reactors were out
service as of January 7, 2012 without any sign of being turned back on in the near
future.36 Aggregately, these anti-nuclear efforts could potentially lead to a 30 percent
decrease in energy supply and, therefore, alternative measures would need to be taken.
However, in the short term Japan’s prime minister Yoshihiko Noda insists that it is
“absolutely impossible” for Japan to survive next summer’s demand needs without
nuclear power.37 On April 13, 2011, the Japanese government announced that two
nuclear reactors at the Oi plant in western Japan were safe to restart; however, the
government is now faced with the decision of whether or not to turn them on.38 While it

34

Jupesta, “Sustainable Energy Policy in Japan, Post Fukushima.”
“Japan’s energy crisis: Nuclear winter,” The Economist, December 10, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/21541464, accessed February 2012.
36
“The Fukushima Black Box: A dangerous lack of urgency in drawing lessons from Japan’s nuclear
disaster,” The Economist, January 7, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21542437, accessed
February 2012.
37
“An Anti-nuclear Protest in Japan: Sayonara, nukes, but not yet,” The Economist, September 24, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/21530147, accessed February 2012.
38
Mari Iwata and Eleanor Warnock, “Japan Government Deems 2 Reactors Safe,” Wall Street Journal,
April 13, 2012,
35
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is deemed necessary in order to avoid blackouts this coming summer and the national
government has the final say regarding the plant’s operation, the government and the
utilities also have a duty to act in line with the wants and needs of the Japanese people.
The government ended “setsuden”, its energy conservation protocols, on
September 9, 2011 as energy demand decreased due to cooler temperatures and energy
supply increased as Japan’s energy portfolio expanded. However as Japan looks ahead,
there are many additional factors to consider regarding daily electricity consumption.39
Japan’s energy demand is declining due to its aging and shrinking population, which
could lead to a decrease in the daily load curve for all hours.40 In addition, if the Japanese
continue their conservation measures Deutsche Bank Group reports an estimated annual
improvement in electricity intensity (primary energy consumption/GDP) of 2.2 percent
rather than the 1.5 percent estimated before Fukushima. This increased efficiency in
electricity use combined with a declining population could yield notable changes in
future demand for electricity.
Continued conservation measures can already be seen by some practicing selfimposed “setsuden” in the winter months even though all government restrictions have
expired. The Japan Soft Drink Association is not refrigerating vending machines during
the day and is changing fluorescent bulbs to LED lighting in areas with a sensitive energy
supply.41 Another example is the Tokyo Tower, which has cut the number of hours it will

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577341591983335470.html, accessed
April 2012
39 “Energy in Japan: Bright ideas needed,” The Economist.
40
Hosoe, “Japan’s Power Supply Crisis: An Assesment,” East-West Wire.
41 “Electricity Demand Hits 93% as Tokyo Chills,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2011,
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/12/09/electricity-demand-hits-93-as-tokyochills/, accessed February 2012.
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be lit up by half as of December 2011.42 While each of these efforts might seem
insignificant individually, the effect on total electricity demand in Japan has been
substantial and Reuters reported in January 2012 that Japan was experiencing the
“eleventh straight month of year-on-year declines.”43 When coupled with a shrinking
population, these “setsuden” have the potential to significantly decrease the daily load
curve. In order to promote this long-term shift, TEPCO plans on deploying smart meters
to a minimum of 80 percent of the utility’s total service territory, allowing consumers to
monitor real-time price signals.44 While all of these efforts suggest a decrease in energy
demand for Japan in the long run, nuclear energy will most likely remain a necessary
element to Japan’s energy portfolio until substantial progress has been made regarding
the implementation of a new grid system, which is necessary in order to deal with the
intermittencies and transmission associated with renewable integration. This substantial
progress could take many years to implement.
Literature Review:
Disasters have become a growing topic in economic research as heated discussion
about global warming, population growth, and urbanization indicate that disasters will
become increasingly relevant economically. Global warming is expected to bring more
frequent, volatile disasters and urbanization increases the damage of disasters in heavily
populated, localized areas, thus the economic effects of disasters are becoming
42
43

Ibid.
“Japan electricity demand falls 5.2 pct y/y in Jan,” Reuters, February 1, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/japan-power-idUSL3E7G20FJ20120201,
accessed February 2012.
44
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increasingly more significant.45 There are two distinct types of disasters: natural disasters
and complex emergencies. Natural disasters are caused by a natural phenomenon and
affect “a population or area and may result in severe damage and destruction and
increased morbidity and mortality that overwhelm local coping capacity”.46 In contrast,
complex emergencies are caused by human actions and “mortality among the civilian
population substantially increases above the population baseline mortality, either as a
result of the direct effects of war or conflict, or indirectly through the increased
prevalence of malnutrition and/or transmission of communicable diseases.”47 Paul
Spiegel’s 2005 paper, “Differences in World Responses to Natural Disasters and
Complex Emergencies,” explores the similarities and differences between the two forms
of disasters.
Spiegel (2005) argues that response to natural disasters is greater than response to
complex emergencies, both politically and financially, because natural disasters are less
politically risky, easier to address, and often more sudden and unexpected.48 The
consequences of both types of disaster usually result in increased basic health needs and
short and long-term mental health effects; however, natural disasters such as the one that
occurred in Japan in March 2011 typically result in deaths and injuries rather than longterm food scarcity and migration. Another major response catalyst is media coverage and
the socioeconomic status of those affected by the disaster, as countries will respond with
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greater magnitude if their citizens are empathetic to the disaster victims.49 Each of the
numerous natural disasters that Spiegel (2005) examines received immediate and
significant funds from sources worldwide, whereas funding was less evident for the
complex emergencies analyzed. Spiegel (2005) concludes that “it is easier to ‘do no
harm’ when responding to a natural disaster than a complex emergency.50 While it may
be “easier” to respond to a natural disaster, the factors that go into that response and their
results prove to be complex and vary by country and disaster type.
While research on disasters has become more extensive, the results are divided on
both the short-term and long-term level. Raddatz (2007) compares the short-term effects
of humanitarian disasters (wars, famines, etc.) and climatic disasters (floods, droughts,
etc.), finding that both have a negative relationship with per-capita income. On average,
climatic and humanitarian disasters cause two and four percent real per-capita income
losses, respectively.51 Noy (2009) examines natural disasters worldwide, specifically
those from 1970 to 2003, and finds a relationship similar to Raddatz, adding that adverse
short-run effects are worsened by a lack of development, education, income, openness to
trade, and government spending.52 Sarmiento (2007) looks at the effect of climatic
disasters on short-run, local employment by analyzing a US flood panel data set and finds
that local employment falls by an average of 3.4 percent after a climatic disaster.53
However, Xiao (2011) runs a time series regression on data from the 1993 Midwest
Flood and finds stable employment levels in the disaster year and after, contradicting
Sarmiento. In addition, Xiao (2011) finds short-run declines in per-capita income in the
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year of the event, which rebounded the following year.54 Belasen and Polacheck (2009)
did a similar study looking at hurricane data, finding that income in the affected area
grew by 4.35 percent due to increased labor demand and decreased labor supply in the
affected area and fell by 4.51 percent in neighboring counties due to increased labor
supply resulting from relocation.55 While views on the short-run impacts of disasters on
unemployment seem to vary by region and time, these economists agree that short-run
per-capita income decreases immediately following a disaster.
Albala-Bertrand (1993) finds contrasting results when using a simple
macroeconomic model to look at the effect of sudden, large (at least 5 percent of loss-toGDP ratio) natural disasters on the growth rate of output. He argues that “economic
effects of large localized natural disasters … rarely affect negatively actual aggregate
output. If anything there often appears to be a positive short-term effect on GDP.”56
Bertrand examines six disasters in six different countries, three climatic and three
geologic, and finds that in four of the six instances countries show both positive and
improved growth rates in the disaster year and thereafter. The two exceptions are shown
to be the result of causes unrelated to the disaster.57 Albala-Bertrand (1993) further
argues that natural disasters result in positive short-term growth in the book, Political
Economy of Large Natural Disasters. In this work, his before-after statistical analysis of
28 natural disasters in 26 countries resulted in a 0.4 percent average increase in GDP,
unchanged inflation, increased capital formation, increases in agricultural and
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construction output, increases in fiscal and trade deficits, and increased reserves.58 More
recently, Noy and Vu (2010) performed a case study to measure the forgone production
resulting from natural disasters in 64 Vietnamese provinces from 1965 to 2006. They find
that more costly disasters appear to boost the economy in the short-run.59 Tol and Leek
(1999) further support these results by suggesting that GDP increases after natural
disasters because GDP focuses on the flow of new production, which occurs because
natural disasters destroy capital stock and therefore ensure increased production in the
short-run.60 Their results are supported by the creative destruction hypothesis, which
states that natural disasters foster adoption of new technology and are an opportunity to
increase the efficiency of capital stock.61 Although the research seems fairly evenly
divided on the short-term effects of natural disasters, the literature that results in positive,
short-term growth seems to include more evidence involving geologic disasters, such as
the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.
In terms of the long-run economic effects of natural disasters, Skidmore & Toya
(2002) are widely cited, but many counter-arguments exist as well. Skidmore & Toya
(2002) use a semi-logarithmic regression containing disaster data for 89 countries
between 1960 and 1990. Their statistical analysis “yields a positive and statistically
significant relationship between number of disasters and economic growth, explaining as
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much as nine percent of the variation in the growth of per capita GDP.”62 They further
divide the data set by region, finding Asia is the most disaster-prone region both in terms
of number of events and deaths.63 Their final conclusion, dividing the set by disaster type,
resulted in a positive correlation between climatic disasters and “economic growth,
human capital investment, and growth in total factor productivity, whereas geologic
disasters are negatively correlated with growth.”64 Miguel & Roland (2010) find similar
positive long-term results from national disasters, but rather than looking at natural
disasters, they examine war disasters, specifically the effects of the US bombing in
Vietnam. They look at bombing intensities in 458 Vietnamese districts and find that the
US bombing in the Vietnam War did not have negative impacts on “local poverty rates,
consumption levels, infrastructure, literacy, or population density through 2002.”65 They
cite the neoclassical growth model as a possible explanation, stating “if war leads to the
partial destruction of the physical capital stock but the production function remains
unchanged, there will be a temporary increase in capital accumulation until the steady
state is again attained.”66
Hallegatte & Dumas (2009) contrast this theory of positive, long run growth postdisaster by arguing that a “poverty trap” exists that decreases the positive effect of a
disaster on GDP. This decrease was especially evident in low-income countries, because
instead of investing in newer, more efficient technology, countries replace damaged
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capital with the same capital used in the past to prevent short-term productivity losses.67
Noy & Nualsari (2007) and Raddatz (2009) provide further counterarguments to
Skidmore & Toya (2002). Both find that disasters have contractionary long-run effects on
GDP using panel data of five-year country observations and cumulative impulse response
functions, respectively. Long-term research is fairly divided due to the difficulty in
constructing models that account for what would have happened to GDP in the absence
of the natural disaster. 68
Rather than looking at the short-term vs. long-term effects of natural disasters,
economists have looked at a country’s level of development as an explanation of the
varying economic effects of natural disasters. Kallenberg & Mobarak (2007) find an
inverse U-shape relationship between a country’s level of development and its economic
losses due to floods and windstorms. However, they find a negative relationship between
increased development and economic losses for geologic disasters. They find a similar
inverse U-shape when looking at the relationship between income and deaths from
natural disasters.69 Both of these relationships indicate more developed countries are less
affected by a natural disaster than are less developed countries. Noy & Nualsri (2011)
further analyze this relationship between development and post-disaster economic effects,
exploring fiscal behavior in a study involving quarterly disaster data from 22 developed
countries and 20 developing countries.70 They find post-disaster counter-cyclical fiscal
behavior in developed countries and post-disaster pro-cyclical fiscal behavior in
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developing countries. In developed countries, their results yield an immediate 1.27
percent of GDP decrease in government revenue, a 0.46 percent of GDP increase in
government payment (peaking in the third quarter of the disaster year), and a 0.28 percent
of GDP decrease in government cash surplus. In developing countries, inverse results are
presented, including decreases in government consumption, government revenue,
government payment, and outstanding debt on impact.71 This paper further defines the
relationship between natural disasters and economic development, highlighting the
adverse effects of poor economic strategies post-disaster in developing countries and
their extended, undesirable macroeconomic outcomes.
In addition to the economic development literature mentioned thus far,
Schumacher & Strobl (2011) find more complex results when they take into
consideration the level of hazard exposure a country faces. They find that the relationship
between wealth and losses depends on hazard exposure. If a country has low hazard
exposure, they find an inverse U-shape relationship similar to the one mentioned by
Kallenberg and Mobarak (2007) with low wealth countries facing increasing losses due to
the small marginal benefit for adaption expenditure.72 However, if a country faces high
hazard exposure they find a U-shape relationship between wealth and economic losses.
They explain this relationship by citing the effect of decreasing marginal returns on
excessive investment in preventative measures for wealthy countries and by identifying
that poorer countries are more willing to take preventative measures because they will
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have a greater percent of their wealth destroyed by a disaster.73 This argument provides
an interesting supplement to the existing literature because many developed countries,
such as Japan, face significant economic losses following natural disasters, suggesting
that they could be inefficiently allocating resources to preventative efforts.
Further studies have been done in hopes of explaining the effects of disasters at
different levels of development, including examining the impacts on a country’s
government structure, business cycle, technological development, and household
structure. Kallenberg & Mobarak (2011) examine the relationship between disaster
recovery and democratic governments, finding that “democratic governments are
expected to have a positive effect on addressing the impact of disaster because they will
be held accountable for their disaster preparations and respond to post-disaster
assistance.”74 Hallegatte & Ghal (2008) argue that economies are more likely to suffer
negative consequences to growth during periods of expansion because their productive
capital is more vulnerable, whereas countries in a recession are able to use their excess
capacity to respond to a disaster.75 Escaleras & Register (2008) analyze 146 earthquakegenerated tsunamis between 1966 and 2004 and find that countries that employ advanced
technologies are better able to predict disaster events and disseminate warnings to the
public.76 Carter et al. (2007) examine household response to natural disasters and find
“households above a certain threshold will be more likely to borrow against their assets
or future earnings” and therefore recover from the disaster more quickly.77 Another study
involving household response to disasters was done by Smith et al. (2006) and further
73
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highlights the differing responses to disasters that occur based on wealth. The paper
indentifies that higher income households do not relocate post-disaster, middle-income
household move away from the disaster zone, and lower-income households often move
into the disaster area in order to benefit from decreased property prices.78 The multiple
factors involved in estimating the post-disaster effects of a natural disaster illustrate the
existing complexities in interpreting the economic and political implications that result in
both the short term and long term following a natural disaster.
This paper’s focus on the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011 and the
resulting nuclear disaster will add a special case study to the existing literature because it
examines the economic effects of both a natural disaster and a complex emergency.
While this paper highlights the localized impacts of the disasters on the electricity market
in Tokyo specifically, it estimates the magnitude of the disaster and proposes a timeline
for the recovery of the Japanese electricity market. As a result, this paper provides insight
into the reactions of both the Japanese government and the consumer to the March 2011
disasters, as well as explains the implications of these reactions on Japan’s economy as a
whole.
Event Study Methodology:
This paper will use event study methodology to formulate the framework for
analyzing the significance of the Fukushima disaster on TEPCO’s electricity loads. The
majority of event study papers have used this methodology to “measure the effects of an

78

Ibid., p. 309.

30
economic event on the value of firms.”79 The data used in these academic papers is
largely based on the stock prices of a specific firm or industry. The null hypothesis for an
event study is typically that the event has no impact on the behavior of returns. Three
periods are used to calculate and analyze the significance of these returns. These periods
include the estimation window, which is a period of time before the event, an event
window, which includes the event being examined, and the post-event window, which is
a period of time after the event has occurred. To determine the effect of an event on stock
prices, abnormal returns are calculated based on the difference between actual returns
that occurred in the event window and the expected returns, which are based on returns in
the estimation period.80
Expected returns are calculated based on one of two approaches: the constant
mean return model or the market model. The constant mean return model uses the mean
return of the firm or industry being examined during an estimation period to calculate
predicted returns. The market model uses a market return (typically based on a major
index) and is the method more widely chosen because it takes “explicit account of the
risk associated with the market and mean returns” given the model has a strong R2
value.81 Abnormal returns are then assumed to be normally distributed around zero and
are tested for significance. There are many ways of analyzing these abnormal returns
including aggregating the abnormal returns into a cumulative abnormal return or taking
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an average abnormal return.82 The significance of these returns is then used to represent
the power of the event in shifting stock prices unexpectedly within the event window.
The event window ranges in size based on the event being studied, but is often fairly
small due to the ability for stock prices to respond quickly to events.83
For example, one event study in the International Research Journal of Finance
and Economics titled “The Impact of Terrorism on Greek Banks’ Stocks” looks at three
terrorist events: the September 11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombing, and the 2005
London train bombing. A wide range of event windows are used, ranging from thirty
days before and after the event to one day before and after the event.84 The abnormal
returns are calculated using the Market Model Method and the Athens Stock Exchange,
and the results show that only September 11 had significant abnormal returns.85 Another
example is Andreas Keller’s “Competition effects of mergers: An event study of the
German electricity market,” which examines the effect of eight different public
announcements by the Swedish company Vattenfall, which acquired three regional utility
companies in Germany during the period 1999 to 2002. The announcements vary from
announcing interest in a utility to acquiring one. A seven-day event window, ranging
from two days before the announcement to four days after, is used for each
announcement along with an estimation period of 89 days that ends 11 days before each
event. Abnormal returns for the utility companies are calculated using the Market Model
Method and the DAX (German index). The results indicate that Vattenfall did not have
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an anti-competitive effect on the German electricity market due to the lack of
significance in stock price changes during their announcement event windows.86
Many of the details mentioned in the papers discussed above are not implemented
here because this paper is not centered on financial data, but rather the electricity loads of
an individual utility. An “abnormal return” cannot be used in this paper because a Market
Model Method cannot be applied to electricity loads due to the lack of a market index
that would provide an accurate benchmark for the Japanese electricity market. As a
result, the significance of the event is captured through a different lens: a time series
regression. This paper looks at the effect of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on electricity
loads through a regression that highlights the hourly shifts in electricity load after the
event. Similar to the studies mentioned above, this study tests the significance of hourly
loads after the disaster by comparing them to the hourly variables for the entire data set.
However, rather than doing this significance test by calculating abnormal returns, dummy
variables are used to capture the significance of the hourly load changes. Due to the large
scale of the nuclear disaster, four event windows are used, ranging from a week after the
disaster to the end of 2011 (the end of the data set). The goal of these event windows is to
capture both short-term and long-term effects of the disasters. A thorough explanation of
the model is presented in the following section.
Model:
The first time series regression model, Model (1) is:
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(1)

Load = βo + β1 disaster + β2 holiday + β3Max + β4Min+ β5atrend + β6dtrend+
β7lpopulation + β8Sun + β9Mon + β10Tue + β11Thu + β12Fri + β13Sat + β14Feb
+ β15Mar + β16Apr + β17May + β18Jun + β19Jul + β20Aug + β21Sep + β22 Oct +
β23Nov + β24Dec + β25one +β26two + β27four + … + β45twentytwo +
β46twentythree +ut

The second model, Model (2), looks identical to the first except the dependent variable is
lLoad, the log of Load. The log form is used in addition to the unmodified loads to make
the variable more comprehensible. The third regression, Model (3), includes interactive
hourly disaster dummy variables:

(3)

Load = βo + β1 holiday + β2Max + β3Min+ β4atrend + β5dtrend+ β6lpopulation
+ β7Sun + β8Mon + β9Tue + β10Thu + β11Fri + β12Sat + β13Feb + β14Mar +
β15Apr + β16May + β17Jun + β18Jul + β19Aug + β20Sep + β21 Oct + β22Nov +
β23Dec + β24zero + β25one + β26two + β27four + … + β45twentytwo +
β46twentythree + β47dzero + β48done + β49dtwo + β50dfour + … +β68dtwentytwo
+ β69dtwentythree + ut

Model (4) looks identical to the third except the dependent variable is lLoad.
The dependent variables, Load and lLoad, represent the hourly electricity loads
(unit of 10 thousand KW) and log of hourly electricity loads for TEPCO from January 1,
2008 to December 31, 2011, respectively. The independent variables that determine the
significance of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident are disaster (dweek, dmonth,
dsummer), hourly variables one through twentythree, interactive hourly disaster variables
done through dtwentythree, and a trend variable dtrend. disaster is a dummy variable that
is zero until March 11, 2011 and then one through the rest of the data set, representing the
event window. The event window extends through the rest of the year due to the
magnitude of the event. While the earthquake and ensuing tsunami took place on March
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11, nuclear reactors were exploding through March 15 and operations at the Fukushima
Daiichi plant were not suspended until March 16.87 Beyond that, a cold shut down of the
plant was not achieved until December 2011.88 On a macro level, nuclear reactors in
Japan are still being shut down; the last of the 56 nuclear reactors shuts down in April or
May of 2012.89 As a result of these continued consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi
disaster, the event window extends to the end of the data set. Additionally, alternative
event windows are substituted for disaster in order to further analyze the short and longterm effects of the disaster. dweek is a dummy variable that is one from March 11, 2011
to March 16, 2011, representing the immediate effects of the disaster. Finally, dmonth is a
dummy variable that is one from March 11, 2011 to March 31, 2011, representing the
short-term effects of the disaster. dsummer is a dummy variable that is one from March
11, 2011 to August 31, 2011, representing the medium-term effects of the disaster. These
variables provide a detailed look into the lasting impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi
disaster.
The hourly disaster interactive variables, done through dtwentythree are disaster
multiplied by corresponding hourly dummy variables, one through twentythree. A
disaster trend variable, dtrend, is included to capture the load movement after the nuclear
accident. The variable starts at one on March 11, 2011 and increases monthly by one,
ending at 10. An annual trend variable, atrend, is also used to indicate movements in the
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load throughout the entire data set. The variable starts one and increases annually, ending
at four. A population variable, lpopulation, is included in log form to account for annual
changes in the Japanese population, which is slowly declining. time increases hourly
throughout the entire data set.
Daily maximum and minimum temperatures for Tokyo, Max and Min (measured
in degrees Celsius), are used in order to control for temporal impacts on load such as
higher temperatures leading to the use of more air conditioning units and therefore
greater demand for electricity. Dummy variables will be used to control for month (Feb
to Dec), day of the week (Sun to Sat excluding Wed), hour (zero to twentythree excluding
three), and holidays (holiday). The holiday dummy variable is one for every major
holiday in Japan and is used to control for load changes based on businesses being closed.
I chose to eliminate Wednesday, January, and hour three from the regression to
avoid multicollinearity. I am assuming that these time variables are the least significant
in terms of load volatility. Wed was chosen because it is in the middle of the week and
therefore fairly predictable in comparison to the other days. Jan was eliminated because it
is in the winter, which tends to be less volatile than the summer months when comparing
temperature swings and the use of air conditioning units. three was eliminated because it
is one of hours with the lowest demand for electricity because businesses are not running
and consumers are sleeping. In addition to eliminating these dummy variables, dtrendsq,
the disaster trend variable dtrend squared, and lagged load variables were eliminated due
to their insignificant effect on the model. Table 1 provides a brief description of all of the
variables used in this paper’s models.
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Table 1.
Variable Descriptions
Variable Name

Description

Variable Name

Description

Load

Electricity load (10
thousand KW)
Log of Electricity load
(10 thousand KW)
Maximum Temperatures
(Celsius)
Minimum Temperatures
(Celsius)
Holidays
March 11th – December
31st 2011

eight

Hour 8

nine

Hour 9

ten

Hour 10

eleven

Hour 11

twelve
thirteen

Hour 12
Hour 13

March 11th – March
16th 2011
March 11th – March 31st
2011
March 11th – August
31st 2011
Hours 0 -23
Annual Trend (20082011)
Monthly Trend postdisaster (3/11-12/11)
Japan Population
Log of population
Time Series variable
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Hour 0

fourteen

Hour 14

fifteen

Hour 15

sixteen

Hour 16

seventeen
eighteen

Hour 17
Hour 18

nineteen

Hour 19

twenty
twentyone
twentytwo
twentythree
dzero
done
dtwo
dthree
dfour
dfive
dsix
dseven
deight
dnine
dten
deleven
dtwelve
dthirteen
dfourteen
dfifteen
dsixteen
dseventeen
deighteen

Hour 20
Hour 21
Hour 22
Hour 23
Disaster Hour 0
Disaster Hour 1
Disaster Hour 2
Disaster Hour 3
Disaster Hour 4
Disaster Hour 5
Disaster Hour 6
Disaster Hour 7
Disaster Hour 8
Disaster Hour 9
Disaster Hour 10
Disaster Hour 11
Disaster Hour 12
Disaster Hour 13
Disaster Hour 14
Disaster Hour 15
Disaster Hour 16
Disaster Hour 17
Disaster Hour 18

lLoad
Max
Min
holiday
disaster
dweek
dmonth
dsummer
hour
atrend
dtrend
population
lpopulation
time
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Sun
Mon
Tue
Wed
Thu
Fri
Sat
zero
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one
two
three
four
five
six
seven

Hour 1
Hour 2
Hour 3
Hour 4
Hour 5
Hour 6
Hour 7

dnineteen
dtwenty
dtwentyone
dtwentytwo
dtwentythree
datef

Disaster Hour 19
Disaster Hour 20
Disaster Hour 21
Disaster Hour 22
Disaster Hour 23
Date (1/1/08 – 12/31/11)

Data:
Observations for this paper were taken every hour for years 2008 through 2011,
creating a time series data set. There are 35,064 observations for each variable. The
hourly electricity loads, Load, are published on TEPCO’s website and the data set is
updated daily. The data represents the demand for electricity for the entire service area.90
The maximum and minimum temperatures for Tokyo, Max and Min, were collected from
a website, TuTiempo, which provides weather information for regions around the
world.91 The temperatures are daily and a macro was used to format the data into my
hourly data set. Japanese holidays, identified in the dummy variable holiday, are chosen
based on the observed holidays listed on timeanddate.com.92 The annual Japanese
population size, population, was taken from data collected by The World Bank.93
The data was collected in January 2012 and entered into STATA. The variables
and summary statistics seem reasonable and as a result provide reasonably accurate
estimates of the variables’ effects on TEPCO’s electricity load; however, autocorrelation
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was initially a problem for all of my regressions. A Durbin Watson test produced values
of 0.288, 0.321, 0.097, and 0.106 for models (1), (2), (3), and (4) respectively, indicating
significant autocorrelation. A Prais-Winston transformation was initially done to correct
for this autocorrelation, but yielded Durbin-Watson values that were still well below the
desired values. This result led me to believe that an AR(1) correction would not fix the
issue, so Newey West standard errors were used instead. Using a Breusch Godfrey test,
lags of 6, 12, 18, and 24 were tested and found to be significant. However, a lag of 24
was chosen due to the hourly division of the data. These tests and the resulting Newey
West transformation are assumed to have corrected the autocorrelation.
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Load

3519.566

704.245

2048

6089

lLoad

8.146

0.199

7.625

8.714

Max

20.284

8.151

1.7

37.2

Min

13.057

8.229

-1.1

28.6

holiday

0.044

0.206

0

1

disaster

0.203

0.402

0

1

dweek

0.004

0.064

0

1

dmonth

0.023

0.148

0

1

dsummer

0.120

0.325

0

1

hour

11.5

6.922

0

23

atrend

2.499

1.118

1

4

dtrend

1.145

2.598

0

10

population

127297030

482639.9

126475664

127704040

lpopulation

18.662

0.004

18.656

18.665

time

17532.5

10122.25

1

35064

Feb

0.077

0.267

0

1

Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Aug, Oct, Dec

0.085

0.279

0

1

Apr, Jun, Sep, Nov

0.082

0.276

0

1
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Sun, Mon

0.142

0.349

0

1

Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri, Sat

0.143

0.350

0

1

zero, one, two…twentythree

0.042

0.200

0

1

dzero, done, dtwo…dtwentythree

0.008

0.091

0

1

datef

18262

421.760

16532

18992

Results:
I expected the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster to have a significant, negative
impact on TEPCO’s electricity load and found results consistent with this hypothesis. All
results for Models (1) and (2) can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix.
All of the variables are significant at the one percent level except for Tue, Thu,
Fri, Feb, and atrend. These variables are insignificant because load is more predictable
and less volatile during the week and in the winter. As seen in Table 3, the disaster
variable is extremely significant with a t-statistic of -13.18. These results estimate that if
the disaster variable is triggered (if the date is within the event window), there is a
652.752 (10 thousand KW) decrease in electricity load. This significant decrease in load
showcases the magnitude of the disaster’s impact on electricity load. The trend variable
atrend suggests a decrease in the demand for electricity throughout the entire data set,
which coincides with Japan’s declining population. Although the variable is not
significant, each additional year shows decreased electricity load by 19.069 (10 thousand
KW). Conversely, the disaster trend variable, dtrend, is significant and positive
suggesting that load is increasing as time passes post-Fukushima. For every month after
the nuclear disaster, electricity load increases by 33.592 (10 thousand KW).
Taking a deeper look into the significance of the dtrend and atrend variables on
Load, an approximate timeline is estimated regarding the disaster’s lasting effects on
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electricity load. An average of hourly pre-disaster loads is taken from January 1, 2008 to
March 10, 2011 and is used as a benchmark for reaching pre-disaster loads (3604. 976 10
thousand KW). The disaster coefficient is used as a representation of the disaster’s
lasting effects on the load (-652.752 10 thousand KW). To calculate the number of
months until pre-disaster load is reached, the dtrend and the atrend are combined by first
dividing the atrend coefficient by twelve and then adding them together to get a monthly
averaged increase in load since the disaster date, March 11, 2011. Based on these
averaged calculations and ignoring all other variables and factors, Model (1)
approximates load will take 20.396 months to reach the pre-disaster hourly load average.
Although this model suggests TEPCO’s loads will recover in November 2012, factors
such as the future structure of both TEPCO and the utility industry as a whole, as well as
other future economic and political implications could disrupt this recovery timeline.
Figures 2 and 3 visually depict the annual trend, disaster trend, and the significant,
extended decrease in load due to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (marked with a red line).
Both Figures 2 and 3 are based on average daily loads over time.
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Figure 2.
TEPCO’s 2008-2011 Electricity Load
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Figure 3.
TEPCO’s 2011 Electricity Load
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Additional event windows are substituted for the variable disaster in order to
determine the lasting impacts of the disaster on electricity load. Model (1) is used for the
regression and the event window variables are substituted in for the dummy variable,
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disaster. Table 4 includes the varying event windows and their corresponding regression
results.
Table 4.
Model (1) Results Substituting Different Event Windows
Load

Event Window

Coefficient

t

P>|t|

dweek

(0,5)

-424.3112

-3.04

0.002

dmonth

(0,20)

-361.418

-6.84

0.000

dsummer

(0,173)

-377.105

-11.6

0.000

disaster

(0,295)

-652.752

-13.18

0.000

All of the disaster variables are significant at the one percent level. The variable
dweek, representing the short-term event window, yields a 424.3112 (10 thousand KW)
decrease in load. This variable highlights the significant, immediate impact of the disaster
on Tokyo’s electricity market. dmonth and dsummer are slightly more significant, largely
due to their lengthier event windows, but decrease load by 361.418 and 377.105 (10
thousand KW), respectively, which is less than the short-term event window variable,
dweek. The most notable result is the original variable, disaster. The magnitude of this
variable, in comparison to the smaller event windows, is unexpected due to its large
impact on electricity load. Given that the other variables’ effect on load decreased as the
event window increased, the contrary effect of disaster suggests an additional underlying
cause for lasting, decreased load beyond the factors that are controlled for in this model
(temperature, seasonality, etc.). Figures 4 (dweek), 5 (dmonth), 6 (dsummer), and 7
(disaster) illustrate the various load levels for the different event windows. The
Fukushima Daiichi disaster is marked with a red line.
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Figure 4.94
TEPCO’S March 10-16, 2011 Electricity Load
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Figure 5.
TEPCO’s March 2011 Electricity Load
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Figure 4 includes hourly loads, whereas Figures 5, 6, and 7 include daily averages of hourly loads
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Figure 6.
TEPCO’S March 11 – August 31, 2011 Electricity Load
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Figure 7.
TEPCO’S March 11 - December 2011 Electricity Load
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Other time dummy variables that have a notable effect on electricity load include
Sat, Sun, and the cooler months such as Sep through Dec (Table 3). All of these variables
impact the load negatively. Sat and Sun decrease load by 305.572 and 489.199 (10
thousand KW) respectively. Sep, Oct, Nov, and Dec decrease load by 458.222, 757.613,
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521.464, and 217.244 (10 thousand KW) respectively. These results are somewhat
expected and supported by my Literature Review as the decreased demand for electricity
on the weekends resulted from businesses being closed. Similarly, decreased demand in
the winter months resulted from cooler temperatures and the lack of air conditioner use.
holiday is also negatively significant, decreasing load by 360.843 if triggered, due to
consumers staying at home and businesses being closed. Daily temperatures, Max and
Min, impacted the load in slightly unexpected ways. Max decreased load by 9.592 (10
thousand KW), which does not follow the assumption that higher temperatures lead to an
increased load. However, the Min coefficient supported this assumption in that the higher
the minimum temperature the higher the demand for electricity, with a coefficient of
24.938.
As seen in Table 3, Model (2) produced similar results in terms of the significance
of the independent variables. Again Tue, Thu, Fri, Feb, and atrend are insignificant
whereas the rest of the variables are significant at the one percent level. The variable
disaster suggests that if the dummy variable is triggered there is a 19.192 percent
decrease in TEPCO’s electricity load. This decrease is extreme and could suggest that
consumers in the TEPCO service area decreased their electricity consumption by more
than was required by the Japanese government, a hypothesis that is supported in my
Institutional Background and Literature Review. These excess saving measures are even
more notable in a country that has fixed electricity prices because even though there were
tight supply margins there were no price spikes to provide additional incentive to save
during these hours.
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The disaster trend variable dtrend indicates for a monthly increase in time after
the disaster, load increases by 1.061 percent (Table 3). The hourly variables zero through
twentythree are the most significant variables in the regression with t-statistics ranging
from 9.83 (hour five) to 192.34 (hour eighteen). Due to the significance of these variables
and their relationship to the daily load curve, models (3) and (4) examine the effect of the
hour on electricity load by looking at hourly and interactive hourly disaster variables and
comparing their magnitude and direction. All results for Models (3) and (4) can be found
in Table 5 in the Appendix.
The regression results for model (3) indicate significance for all variables
except atrend, lpopulation, Tue, Thu, Fri, Feb, and the constant. Examining the
hourly variables, the hourly dummy variables that represent the entire data set, zero
through twentythree, have a positive effect on the electricity load; whereas, the
disaster hourly interactive variables, dzero through dtwentythree, have a negative
effect on Load. In both sets of hourly variables, on-peak hours, especially hours
nine, ten, and seventeen through nineteen, are the most significant and have the
largest standard errors. This result supports my hypothesis that on-peak hours are
critical when determining demand because they are the hours in which consumers
are the most active either at home or at work and they are also the most volatile due
to changes in temperature, work hours, and other unexpected conditions.
The results for model (4) indicate the same significant variables as model (3).
Again, the on peak interactive hourly disaster variables are the most significant in
representing the effect of the disaster on electricity load. The most significant morning
on-peak hours are hours deight, dnine, and dten which typically represent the morning
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spike in load due to the start of the business day. These hours decrease electricity load
post-disaster by 17.49 percent, 18.22 percent, and 16.16 percent respectively. The most
significant afternoon on-peak hours are hours dseventeen, deighteen, and dnineteen which
typically represent the highest demand hours and are followed by significantly lower
demand. These hours decrease electricity load post-disaster by 18.8 percent, 18. 52
percent, and 17.89 percent respectively.
Table 6.
Variable Comparison Results: Hourly vs. Disaster Hourly Interactive Variables

(Hour) - d(Hour) = 0
Hour

Model (3)
F(1, 34994)
Prob > F

Model (4)
F(1, 34994)
Prob > F

0

310.51

0.000

430.8

0.000

1

173.29

0.000

253.58

0.000

2

99.52

0.000

149.62

0.000

4

49.84

0.000

73.9

0.000

5

82.2

0.000

120.8

0.000

6

250.04

0.000

339.66

0.000

7

613.4

0.000

774.66

0.000

8

1166.29

0.000

1363.42

0.000

9

1589.7

0.000

1774.9

0.000

10

1671.08

0.000

1852.65

0.000

11

1565.04

0.000

1746.04

0.000

12

1279.48

0.000

1478.13

0.000

13

1361.63

0.000

1533.67

0.000

14

1327.64

0.000

1492.13

0.000

15

1350.63

0.000

1516.46

0.000

16

1604.68

0.000

1770.03

0.000

17

1941.69

0.000

2087.25

0.000

18

2119.79

0.000

2282.39

0.000

19

1934.2

0.000

2116.38

0.000

20

1591.51

0.000

1800.85

0.000

21

1200.05

0.000

1419.91

0.000
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22

969.1

0.000

1179.57

0.000

23

635.8

0.000

820.81

0.000

The results in Table 6 further support my hypothesis by showing that when
comparing the hourly variables to the interactive hourly disaster variables, the on-peak
hours are the most significant. Again this result shows that the greatest conservation
efforts and government regulation occurred between hours seven to twenty. It is also
important to note that these hours have been targeted in response to a supply shock
because these hours have the highest demand and therefore have to be closely monitored
and regulated in order to prevent blackouts. These results support the absence of
blackouts post-Fukushima and reveal the magnitude of the conservation measures that
were taken, both by regulation and choice. Table 6 further displays the significance of
hours nine and ten as well as hours seventeen through nineteen as holding the greatest
shifts in demand after the accident. Looking at these results through the lens of the daily
load curve, it is possible that these hours observed the greatest change post-Fukushima
because they were the points in the day with the greatest amount of transition. In terms of
going to and from work, this period marked the time when people could take measures
such as turning off all of the lights and air conditioning units before heading to work and
businesses could turn off unused lights and raise internal temperatures at the end of the
business day. As a result of these seemingly minor changes, large decreases in demand
can be explained.
Conclusion:
By creating a model to analyze the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster on TEPCO’s electricity load, this paper determined the magnitude of the accident
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by collecting a large hourly data set and determining an event window that would
indicate the lasting effect of the disaster on the demand for electricity. This paper
successfully indicates the magnitude of the Fukushima disaster, both aggregately and
hourly. Overall, the results reveal that the disaster significantly decreased electricity load.
The large event window supports this result as it highlights the continuous negative
impact of the disaster through the end of 2011 and most likely for a long period into the
future. Given that Model (2) approximates the disaster to have decreased load by almost
twenty percent for the period, the recovery period for electricity demand to return to preaccident levels could take years, and may never return to these levels, especially given
the declining population and consumer resistance to nuclear energy. These results are
therefore economically and politically significant given the future uncertainty within the
Japanese electricity industry. Furthermore, by presenting evidence on the severity of the
economic impacts of the Tohoku earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, this
paper supports the need for changes in preventative measures. A possible solution is to
expand the country’s supply chain to be dispersed more evenly throughout the country
and to invest in foreign production facilities in order to limit production setbacks in the
future.
While this paper provides a solid platform in terms of analyzing the effects of the
Fukushima Daiichi disaster on TEPCO’s daily load curve, it may be possible to obtain
more refined, explanatory results by further dividing the data set. One approach would be
to divide the service area into coastal and inland regions or regions that are closer to
Fukushima compared to those farther away. By further refining the regions, a more
precise impact of the disaster could be detected. A second method would be to divide the
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load by industrial sector in order to see which industries observed the most significant
decreases in electricity, how those decreases affected the industry’s productivity, and for
how long decreases last and have an impact. This method would also provide more
refined evidence regarding industries that are severely impacted by the disaster and
therefore which industries could disperse their suppliers and production in order to
minimize the economic blow of a disaster.
Another approach could be to look at disaster-month and disaster-weekday
interactive variables in order to further determine which months and days observed the
most significant changes in load post-Fukushima. While my paper indicates that load is
increasing as we move away from the disaster date (significance and direction of dtrend),
a closer look into regulated decreases versus consumer chosen decreases in load is
needed to fully capture the direction in which future load is headed and how these
changes will affect the daily load curve. By controlling for the fifteen percent decrease in
electricity demand mandated by the Japanese government, one could quantify the excess
saving measures being taken, which could lead to a deeper analysis of the lasting demand
changes taking place in the Tokyo area.
Although this paper does not differentiate between government mandated load
reductions and consumer chosen reductions, it does highlight the hours that have seen the
greatest change in load post-Fukushima. By revealing these hours as the transition
periods in the daily load curve, future policies can target these hours if additional saving
measures need to be taken. Utilities can also take advantage of these changes when
forecasting future electricity demand and signing future supply contracts. Utilities often
use different types of energy based on demand, price, and time of day so long term
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changes in the daily load curve could affect the type of energy policies they use.
Furthermore, changes in utility operations could affect the prices and policies directed
towards TEPCO customers. Given the complex relationship between Japanese regulators,
utilities, and customers it is hard to predict the long-term effect of the supply shock and
decreased demand that resulted from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster; however, this paper
provides initial insight into the effects of the disaster.
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Appendix:
Table 3.
Models (1) and (2) Regression Results

Variables
disaster
holiday
Max
Min
atrend
dtrend
lpopulation
Sun
Mon
Tue
Thu
Fri
Sat
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep

Coefficients
Model 1
Model 2
Load
lLoad
-652.752
-0.192
(13.18)**
(13.93)**
-360.843
-0.105
(10.93)**
(10.74)**
-9.592
-0.003
(3.94)**
(4.16)**
24.938
0.006
(6.92)**
(6.50)**
-19.069
-0.006
(-1.4)
-1.67
33.592
0.011
(6.88)**
(7.40)**
-17,596.88
-5.187
(2.64)**
(2.92)**
-489.2
-0.138
(24.18)**
(25.16)**
-65.884
-0.022
(3.00)**
(3.86)**
-0.324
-0.001
(-0.02)
(-0.13)
1.302
0.001
(-0.07)
-0.15
-16.177
-0.003
(-0.74)
(-0.61)
-305.573
-0.081
(14.59)**
(14.40)**
47.212
0.015
(-1.17)
(-1.39)
-287.047
-0.074
(7.14)**
(6.71)**
-597.998
-0.16
(12.62)**
(12.31)**
-775.04
-0.213
(13.90)**
(13.91)**
-629.228
-0.164
(9.64)**
(9.31)**
-237.756
-0.058
(2.84)**
(2.58)**
-236.731
-0.061
(2.77)**
(2.64)**
-458.222
-0.119

Variables
zero
one
two
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
ten
eleven
twelve
thirteen
fourteen
fifteen
sixteen
seventeen
eighteen
nineteen
twenty
twentyone

Coefficients
Model 1
Model 2
Load
lLoad
346.77
0.119
(84.59)**
(106.68)**
174.364
0.062
(56.69)**
(69.49)**
67.361
0.024
(30.34)**
(38.15)**
-25.417
-0.01
(11.88)**
(15.63)**
31.237
0.01
(9.56)**
(9.83)**
265.517
0.09
(44.24)**
(49.11)**
571.111
0.186
(71.76)**
(85.58)**
922.415
0.287
(94.19)**
(119.22)**
1,191.39
0.359
(104.77)**
(137.10)**
1,269.96
0.379
(104.81)**
(137.26)**
1,280.59
0.381
(99.66)**
(129.28)**
1,126.78
0.342
(90.57)**
(116.20)**
1,237.44
0.369
(92.70)**
(117.97)**
1,241.92
0.37
(90.08)**
(114.24)**
1,225.17
0.366
(91.71)**
(116.34)**
1,307.97
0.388
(104.12)**
(135.43)**
1,378.78
0.408
(124.52)**
(166.46)**
1,409.55
0.417
(141.57)**
(192.34)**
1,333.75
0.399
(142.05)**
(188.93)**
1,177.77
0.36
(133.79)**
(173.61)**
981.552
0.308
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(6.39)**
-757.613
(13.73)**
-521.464
Nov
(12.07)**
-217.244
Dec
(5.23)**
t statistics in parentheses

Oct

(6.06)**
-0.204
(13.56)**
-0.137
(11.55)**
-0.053
(4.60)**

(117.89)**
(149.20)**
850.942
0.272
(113.30)**
(143.22)**
619.663
0.205
twentythree
(92.19)**
(114.17)**
331,622.41
104.851
Constant
(2.66)**
(3.16)**
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

twentytwo

Table 4.
Models (3) and (4) Regression Results

Variables
holiday
Max
Min
atrend
dtrend
lpopulation
Sun
Mon
Tue
Thu
Fri
Sat
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun

Coefficients
Model 3
Model 4
Load
lLoad
-361.38
-0.105
(10.94)**
(10.75)**
-9.726
-0.003
(4.00)**
(4.21)**
24.874
0.006
(6.90)**
(6.46)**
-10.912
-0.003
(-0.81)
(-0.9)
24.4
0.007
(5.40)**
(5.62)**
-9,435.48
-2.41
(-1.54)
(-1.46)
-489.351
-0.138
(24.25)**
(25.18)**
-65.931
-0.022
(3.01)**
(3.86)**
-0.336
-0.001
(-0.02)
(-0.13)
1.322
0.001
(-0.07)
(-0.15)
-16.613
-0.004
(-0.76)
(-0.64)
-305.671
-0.081
(14.60)**
(14.37)**
47.176
0.015
(-1.17)
(-1.39)
-304.939
-0.08
(7.55)**
(7.17)**
-621.433
-0.168
(13.24)**
(13.02)**
-795.231
-0.22
(14.29)**
(14.36)**
-646.483
-0.17
(9.89)**
(9.60)**

Variables
thirteen
fourteen
fifteen
sixteen
seventeen
eighteen
nineteen
twenty
twentyone
twentytwo
twentythree
dzero
done
dtwo
dfour
dfive
dsix

Coefficients
Model 3
Model 4
Load
lLoad
1,367.89
0.405
(84.16)**
(101.81)**
1,372.18
0.405
(82.02)**
(99.29)**
1,355.87
0.401
(83.51)**
(101.00)**
1,443.95
0.424
(94.23)**
(114.72)**
1,523.62
0.446
(111.25)**
(134.69)**
1,553.42
0.455
(123.08)**
(147.61)**
1,470.54
0.435
(120.78)**
(142.91)**
1,304.50
0.395
(109.81)**
(128.76)**
1,096.34
0.341
(93.58)**
(109.42)**
955.228
0.302
(85.75)**
(100.49)**
713.882
0.233
(66.97)**
(78.74)**
-403.066
-0.13
(10.36)**
(11.85)**
-368.795
-0.123
(9.50)**
(11.31)**
-333.241
-0.113
(8.56)**
(10.40)**
-295.253
-0.101
(7.61)**
(9.34)**
-325.417
-0.11
(8.44)**
(10.27)**
-403.411
-0.131
(10.42)**
(11.99)**
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-251.757
(2.99)**
-248.324
Aug
(2.89)**
-468.173
Sep
(6.51)**
-766.345
Oct
(13.86)**
-528.967
Nov
(12.24)**
-223.382
Dec
(5.37)**
428.431
zero
(45.05)**
249.082
one
(27.48)**
134.876
two
(15.41)**
34.402
four
(3.99)**
97.168
five
(10.72)**
347.249
six
(32.50)**
675.307
seven
(56.40)**
1,047.08
eight
(79.40)**
1,328.21
nine
(92.45)**
1,410.32
ten
(94.58)**
1,417.52
eleven
(90.41)**
1,256.77
twelve
(82.16)**
t statistics in parentheses

Jul

-0.063
(2.78)**
-0.065
(2.80)**
-0.123
(6.20)**
-0.207
(13.72)**
-0.14
(11.76)**
-0.055
(4.76)**
0.146
(53.83)**
0.086
(33.12)**
0.047
(18.73)**
0.011
(4.36)**
0.033
(12.25)**
0.116
(36.91)**
0.218
(65.07)**
0.323
(93.59)**
0.396
(111.46)**
0.416
(114.92)**
0.417
(110.03)**
0.378
(100.05)**

-514.29
-0.157
(13.30)**
(14.41)**
-615.302
-0.175
deight
(15.87)**
(16.03)**
-675.293
-0.182
dnine
(16.93)**
(16.32)**
-692.767
-0.185
dten
(16.91)**
(16.16)**
-675.869
-0.18
deleven
(16.06)**
(15.37)**
-641.575
-0.177
dtwelve
(15.07)**
(14.91)**
-643.862
-0.173
dthirteen
(14.81)**
(14.31)**
-642.948
-0.172
dfourteen
(14.62)**
(14.08)**
-645.12
-0.174
dfifteen
(14.85)**
(14.33)**
-671.162
-0.179
dsixteen
(15.87)**
(15.12)**
-714.879
-0.188
dseventeen
(17.40)**
(16.34)**
-710.114
-0.185
deighteen
(17.77)**
(16.66)**
-675.14
-0.179
dnineteen
(16.94)**
(16.11)**
-625.553
-0.171
dtwenty
(15.82)**
(15.48)**
-566.586
-0.161
dtwentyone
(14.46)**
(14.65)**
-514.731
-0.15
dtwentytwo
(13.30)**
(13.78)**
-465.043
-0.142
dtwentythree
(12.11)**
(13.13)**
179,187.07
52.977
Constant
(-1.57)
(-1.72)
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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55
Bibliography

Albala-Bertrand, J. M. “Natural Disaster Situations and Growth: A Macroeconomic
Model for Sudden Disaster Impacts.” World Development 21 (February 1993):
1425. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
“An Anti-nuclear Protest in Japan: Sayonara, nukes, but not yet.” The Economist,
September 24, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21530147, accessed
February 2012.
Buesseler, Ken. “What Fukushima accident did to the ocean.” CNN, March 10, 2012.
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/10/opinion/buesseler-fukushima-ocean/index.html,
accessed March 2012.
Williams, S., Brian Spegele, and Chester Dawson. “Nuclear Pushes on Despite
Fukushima.” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020427630457726524028429588
0.html, accessed March 2012.
Cavallo, Eduardo and Ilan Noy. “The Economics of Natural Disasters.” Inter-American
Development Bank 124 (May 2010): 15. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed
April 2012.
“Disaster in Japan: Plutonium and Mickey Mouse.” The Economist, March 31, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/18488463, accessed October 2011.
“Electricity Demand Hits 93% as Tokyo Chills.” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2011.
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/12/09/electricity-demand-hits-93-astokyo-chills/, accessed February 2012.
“Electricity Market in Japan.” PowerPoint presentation to Public, July 2004. Tokyo
Electric Power Company, www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/presen/pdf-1/0406-e.pdf,
accessed February 2012.
“Energy in Japan: Bright ideas needed.” The Economist, September 17, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/21529037, accessed October 2011.
“Fair Competition and Transparency.” Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan.
http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/fair_competition/index.html,
accessed February 2012.
Fujita, Masahisa and Nobuaki Hamaguchi. “Japan and Economic Integration in East
Asia: Post-Disaster Scenario.” Annals of Regional Science 48 (2012): 493.
ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
Fulton, M., Michael Carboy, Jane Cao, and Lucy Cotter. “Japan – The Peoples’ Greener
Choice,” Deutsche Bank Group, August, 2011,

56
http://nukefreetexas.org/downloads/Japan_The_Peoples_Greener_Choice.pdf,
accessed October 2011.
“History of Japan’s Electric Power Industry.” Federation of Electric Power Companies of
Japan. http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/history/index.html,
accessed February 2012.
Hosoe, Tomoko. “Japan’s Power Supply Crisis: An Assessment.” East-West Wire, March
21, 2011, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/japanspower-supply-crisis-an-assessment, accessed November 2011.
“Japan electricity demand falls 5.2 pct y/y in Jan.” Reuters, February 1, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/japan-poweridUSL3E7G20FJ20120201, accessed February 2012.
“Japan’s energy crisis: Nuclear winter.” The Economist, December 10, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/21541464, accessed February 2012.
“Japan’s energy crisis: Powerful savings.” The Economist, April 27, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/04/japans_energy_crisis, accessed
October 2011.
“Japan’s nuclear conundrum: The $64 billion question.” The Economist, November 5,
2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21536600, accessed February 2012.
“Japan’s nuclear crisis: The Meltdown and the Media.” The Economist, January 16, 2012.
http://www.economist.com/node/21542992, accessed February 2012.
“Japan’s nuclear plants: Half-life.” The Economist, May 20, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2011/05/japans_nuclear_plants,
accessed October 2011.
Jupesta, Joni, and Aki Suwa. “Sustainable Energy Policy in Japan, Post Fukushima”.
International Association for Energy Economics, Fourth Quarter 2011. Accessed
October 2011.
Kellenberg, Derek and A. Mushfiq Mobarak. “The Economics of Natural Disasters.”
Annual Review of Resource Economics 3 (June 2011): 298. ABI/INFORM via
EconLit, accessed April 2012.
Keller, Andreas. “Competition effects of mergers: An event study of the German
electricity market.” Energy Policy 38 (2010): 5264-5271. ABI/INFORM via
EconLit, accessed February 2012.
Kikuchi, Masao and Akira Nakamura. “What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet
Learned: Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan.” Public
Administration Review 71, (2011): 895. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed
January 2012.

57
MacKinlay, Craig A. “Event Studies in Economics and Finance,” Journal of Economic
Literature 35 (March 1997): 13-39. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed
February 2012.
Miguel, Edward and Gerard Roland. “The Long Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam.”
NBER Working Paper No. 11954, 2006.
Noy, Ilan. “The Macroeconomic Consequences of disasters.” Journal of Development
Economics 88 (2009): 221. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
Noy, Ilan and Aekkanush Nualsri. “Fiscal Storms: Public Spending and Revenues in the
Aftermath of Natural Disasters.” Environment and Development Economics 16
(2011):119-120. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
Noy, Ilan and Tam Bang Vu. “The Economics of Natural Disasters in a Developing
Country: The Case of Vietnam.” Journal of Asian Economics 21 (March 2010):
347. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
Obe, Mitsuru. Japan Business Lobby Head: Against Nationalization of Tepco, Support
Electricity Rate Hikes.” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120227701005.html?mod=WSJ_qtoverview_wsjlatest, accessed February 2012.
Pasquier, Sara. “Saving Electricity in a Hurry: Update 2011.” International Energy
Agency, June 2011. www.iea.org/papers/2011/saving_electricity.pdf, accessed
February 2012.
“Power in Japan: The troubles of TEPCO.” The Economist, June 30, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/18899008, accessed October 2011.
Price, P. “Methods for Analyzing Electric Load Shape and its Variability.” Ernest
Orlando Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory, May 2010. Accessed September
2011.
Repousis, Spyridon, and Panagiotis Liargovas. “The Impact of Terrorism on Greek
Banks’ Stocks: An Event Study.” International Research Journal of Finance and
Economics 51 (2010): 88-96.
Sato, Shigeru. “Tokyo Power Demand Reaches Highest Since Quake on Heat Wave.”
Bloomberg, June 29, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-29/tokyopower-demand-reaches-highest-since-quake-on-heat-wave-2-.html,
accessed
October 2011.
Sato, Shigeru, and Emi Urabe. “Power Companies Borrow Record in Loans as Cost of
FuelJumps:
Japan
Credit.”
Bloomberg,
October
6,
2011.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/power-companies-borrow-recordin-loans-as-cost-of-fuel-jumps-japan-credit.html, accessed October 2011.

58
Schumacher, Ingmar and Eric Strobl. “Economic Development and Losses Due to
Natural Disasters: the Role of Hazard Exposure.” Ecological Economics 72
(October 2011): 99. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
Siegel, Donald, and Abagail McWilliams. “Event Studies in Management Research:
Theoretical and Empirical Issues.” The Academy of Management Journal 40
(June 1997): 626-657.
“Summary Report of RSMC Beijing on Fukushima Nuclear Accident Emergency
Response.” World Meteorological Organization, October 31, 2011. Accessed
February 2012.
Skidmore, Mark and Hideki Toya. “Do Natural Disasters Promote Long-Run Growth?”
Economic Inquiry 40 (October 2002): 665. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed
April 2012.
Spiegel, Paul. “Differences in World Responses to Natural Disasters and Complex
Emergencies.” Journal of the American Medical Association 293 (April 2005):
1915. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.
“Summer Electricity Saving Measures and Their Effects for Office and Commercial
Buildings.” The Institute of Energy Economics Japan, May 13, 2011. Accessed
October 2011.
“TEPCO raises electricity prices for corporate clients.” BBC News, January 17, 2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16589072, accessed February 2012.
“The Fukushima Black Box: A dangerous lack of urgency in drawing lessons from
Japan’s
nuclear
disaster.”
The
Economist,
January
7,
2012.
http://www.economist.com/node/21542437, accessed February 2012.
The

World
Bank.
“Data:
Japan.”
The
World
Bank
http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan, accessed March 2012.

Time and Date. “Calendar for Year 2011 (Japan).” Time and Date website.
http://www.timeanddate.com/calendar/?year=2011&country=26, accessed
2012.

website.

February

Tokyo Electric Power Company. “Electricity Forecast.” Tokyo Electric Power Company
website. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/forecast/html/download-e.html, accessed
September 2011.
Tu Tiempo. “Climate Tokyo Historical Weather.” Tu Tiempo website.
http://www.tutiempo.net/en/Climate/Tokyo/476620.htm, accessed December 2011.
Wallace, Rick. “Tokyo must decide who will pay to keep Fukushima plant owner
TEPCO afloat.” The Australian, October 7, 2011.

59
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/tokyo-must-decide-who-willpay-to-keep-fukushima-plant-owner-tepco-afloat/story-e6frg9if-1226160647274,
accessed October 2011.
Xiao, Yu. “Local Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters.” Journal of Regional Science
51 (2011): 817. ABI/INFORM via EconLit, accessed April 2012.

